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one's analysis. Before we can make an induction or a
retroduction, we must first isolate the parameters that
are likely to yield significant results. It is this feature of
enquiry that Mill wished to emphasize, but he did it in
a somewhat maladroit way by describing the selection as
"inference" and by suggesting that it was quasi-formal in
character. The use of Mill's canons would, of course, involve induction or retroduction insofar as the formulation of a law or a theory resulted. But their emphasis was
not on the way in which one got from evidence to law or
theory; rather it was on the sorts of clue that could lead
one to the significant parameters in the first place.
Likewise, one could point out various other procedures
that are integral to scientific research : construction of
apparatus, measurement, classification . . . . Some are
better defined than others, but none can be completely
formalized. There is always the stubborn complexity and
resistance of the material order, summarized in "Mur-

phy's Law" of experiment: if anything can go wrong, it
will. But when people ask "ls there a well defined scientific method?" they are not thinking of these contingencies. They are thinking of inference. And our answer to them, in short, is: justification-inference follows
relatively well defined patterns in empirical science,
though it is never completely well defined (i.e., completely formal). Whereas discovery-inference is guided
by well defined rules only where empirical correlations
are concerned, and even there, the guidance is not a coercive one. In the far more significant area of hypothesis
and theory, "methods" of discovery are tentative and
extremely limited in scope. This is where genius is needed, where the incommunicable creativity of the talented
individual sparks the gap. For genius is precisely the
ability to stray from the well defined pathways and to
find something that no amount of methodic path following would ever have revealed.

Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
A Philosopher's Answer
MARGUERITE FOSTER
Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colo.
ABSTRACT - Tbe question "Is There A Well Defined Scientific Method?" can not be answered
without taking into account the varying aims of scientific inquiry as conceived historically as well
as within the framework of various sciences. The term "method" is also subject to ambiguity.
The answer would seem to be negative, if we mean that there is a fixed set of well-established
rules which if followed will lead to fruitful scientific results. It is positive, if we mean that science
has developed fairly reliable patterns and criteria for acceptable explanatory laws and theories,
experimental design, and observational confirmation, that are part of the program if not the practice of scientists at the present time.

The question prompts another question that I am, in
part, inclined to suppress, namely: By what method
should one try to answer the question?
Philosophers who write about science and scientific
method disagree on whether or not the answer can be
found by reading histories of science or historical documents, or by watching scientists at work or questioning
them, or by a "rational reconstruction" of the logic of
the written works of scientists - or perhaps by all of
these plus an ingredient of the philosopher's own intuition. Even when one or the other of these approaches is
explicitly made, a philosopher reading the finished work
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will find disagreement with the correct analysis of scientific method.
Scientists in their practice of science and in their published scientific reports do not generally state their rules
of procedure, except as technical recipes. A philosopher
also does not always make clear whether he is concerned
with methods that scientists here and now do use, or
agree upon, or whether he is concerned with an ideal
logical "model" of the essential criteria of the methods,
or for the right to have confidence in such methods. My
own view is that it is actual scientific practice, within the
framework of an historical period, as far as this can be
isolated, with which a philosopher ought to be concerned. Otherwise, it is logic, or an ideal program of
what an ideally valid science should be.
If science is to be defined, or partially defined, by its
methods, it is perhaps possible at least to agree that a
method is a set of rules and procedures, either stated or
implicitly used, that can be deliberately followed and its
value tested in terms of its results. The results will be a
function of the aims. Perhaps, indeed, several methods
will reach the same results equally adequately. So much
27

for a definition of "method." Scientific method, then, is
the method or methods used to achieve the particular
aims regarded as scientific. The success of the method
would be defined in terms of its achievement of the aims.
What do philosophers of science see as the method of
science? Philosophers who analyze science are often gazing at a Rorshach inkblot and projecting into it their
own private intelJectual wishes. One sees in it a game,
another an instrument, or a building erected above a
swamp; others see in it half-closed zippers, nets, or maps,
or an evolutionary tree. From these metaphors, they may
move on to law-like sentences, quasi-deductive systems,
hypothctico-dcductive-imluctivc systems, pure and impure deductive systems, model-languages, models, basic
statements, observation statements, and even sense-data.
By this time a meta-language has been constructed in
such a way that it is difficult often to see its bearing upon
the less esoteric and abstract features of actual science.
Hempel and Oppenheimer (The Logic of Scientific
Explanation) say that ''a view will be rejected because it
does not seem to accord with the meaning customarily
asigned to the concept in science and methodological
inquiry." Yet, we are still stuck with philosopher's
"views": Nagel's views, Carnap's views, Ramsey's views ,
Braithwaite's, Popper's, et al. Perhaps the best we can
hope for is some kind of statistical or evidential convergence so that it will become more probable that a "view"
is correct if it is agreed upon by the largest number of
competent analysts, or observers.
I shall illustrate by an example from Popper (The
Logic of Scientific Discovery). "Science does not rest on
rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theories rises, as
it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on
piles. The piles are driven down from above into the
swamp, but not down to any natural or given base; and
when we cease our attempts to drive our piles into a
deeper layer it is not because we have reached firm
ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they
are firm enough to carry the structure for the time being." But Braithwaite tells us, "The peaks of science may
appear to be floating in the clouds but their foundations
are in the hard facts of experience." Popper tells us,
"Just as chess might be defined by the rules ,proper to it,
so empirical science might be defined by means of methodological rules. First a supreme rule is laid down which
serves as a kind of norm for deciding on the remaining
rules; . . . methodological rules are regarded as conventions. They might be described as the rules of the
game of empirical science. An example of a rule is as
follows: The game of science is in principle without end."
Science has been defined historically not so much in
terms of rules of methodology, as in terms of the aims
of science. Methods of science follow upon the aims. The
most general aim of science has always been to "understand nature." But what counts as "understanding" has
differed, with respect to emphasis on what needs to be
understood, as well as the best, or most rational procedure for understanding it. Stephen Toulmin (Foresight
and Understanding), has pointed out that the pre-Socratics were concerned with theoretical possibilities of giv-
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ing a rational account of the multiplicity of nature. Their
methods were attuned to this goal and therefore did not
involve testable empirical hypotheses, or attempts at prediction, or even attempts to formulate laws. Rather, they
were exploring the logic of scientific explanation and understanding. To explain change scientifically, for example,
would involve relating the changing to something that did
not change, thus setting up a "model" for the search for
invariants in nature. Forecasting, alone, was not regarded
as definitive in giving an "intelligible account of" nature.
It was only much later that the idea of giving an account
of the success of forecasting techniques began to enter
into science as one of its additional aims. Early philosopher-scientists, then, were concerned with exploring patterns of understanding and of explaining nature. Let me
take an examp'1e: The annual flooding of the Nile was a
problem that aroused interest, practical and theoretical.
Herodotus ( The Persian Wars), in his attempt at explanation, certainly combined appeal to existing knowledge,
as well as to the rejection of Thale's theory on the
grounds that the Nile flooded in the absence of winds as
well as in their presence, and to the observation that other rivers should behave similarly but did not. Observation, as well as the search for a theory that was logically
consistent with other information already known, guided
his account. A theory to be scientific must be capable of
disproof, or falsifiable; it cannot be "obscure," according
to Herodotus. Forecasting, however, had already been
mastered. There was no question of predicting when the
Nile would rise. The criteria of the scientific adequacy of
his explanation, while not explicitly stated, were implied
in his rejection of previous theories: They contradicted
the evidence from observation.
Lucretius (The Nature of the Universe) stated explicitly in explaining the attraction of iron to the magnet, that
"In matters of this sort it is necessary to establish a number of facts before you can offer an explanation of them·'
( on the action of the magnet). The "facts" Lucretius offered consisted of his theory of the particulate nature of
matter, empty space, and some gross observations of the
properties of metals.
Within physics, the analysis of the motion of bodies
and its explanations has provided one of the longest traditions in the history of science. Galileo ( On Falling Bodies) exemplifies the method of discrediting and rejecting one method of explanation, and establishing and defending another. Conceptual analysis, experimentation actual or imagined - and the use of mathematics are
,prominent in Naturally Accelerated and Projectile Motion. Such a model became the exemplar for many subsequent scientific investigations. It is not erroneous to say
that Newton (The Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy * )
provided the culmination of this model in a mathemmical
deductive model, taking principles and laws as basic pos* I. The rule of parsimony or simplicity.
2. The ru.le of same cause. same effect.
3. The whole-part rule.
4. The rule of confidence in induction until future experience
renders the induction questionable or establishes it more accurately.
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tulates. Newton's New Theory About Light and Colors
exemplifies experimental method; and Huygen's Treatise
on Light shows the influence of the introduction of hypothetical entities ("waves" of light) .
If the question were directed to the Newtonian model,
and Newtonian aims, the answer, based upon the Principia would have to be yes for that aspect and phase of
physics. The method as Newton saw it was well defined.
The aim was to give an axiomatic deductive systematic
account of the motions of bodies.
We now find the following statement made with respect to theoretical physics: "The purpose of theoretical
physical science is to postulate a conceptual model of
nature from which the observed behavior may be predicted quantitatively." (Scientific Monthly, Vol. 81, No.
1, July 1955.) "The method is (i) postulate a model
based on existing experimental measurements; (ii) check
the predictions of this model against further measurements; and (iii) adjust or replace the model as required
by new measurements. - No claim is made about the
"reality" of the model; the sole criterion is successful
prediction from the simplest or most convenient or most
satisfying model." (Marshall J. Walker, "An Orientation
Toward Modern Physical Theory") . It is Walker's view
that this method is the result of a continuous, cumulative

and corrected, scientific process. The creative work of
scientists is in the postulation of the new model and in
the ingenuity needed to test it. "Understanding a model"
is defined as regarding it as a special case of a more general model.

To summarize: Predictive success, while counting as
one of the aims of scientific inquiry, exists alongside other
aims, among these to give an explanation of the predictive success of a model or theory. There is no universal
recipe or set of methods that is valid for all science at all
times because the aims of science vary, and because science is in part creative and inventive as well as developmental. Speculative imagination, logical techniques, computational skill and invention, controlled observation, an
intuitive "sense" of evidence, and new conceptual ideas
and ideals, all figure in the methods of scientific inquiry.
Predictive success is only one of the aims of model, or
theory construction; it is only one of the criteria of "rational understanding." What is taken to be "rational"
and "natural" may change, as well as the aims of science.
New aims may generate new methods both of discovery
as well as of explanation. New techniques - logical, computational, experimental - may generate new demands
upon acceptance and rejection of scientific aims.

Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
A Physicist's Answer
RUSSELL K. HOBBIE
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ABSTRACT - The traditional view of the scientific method is on oversimplification that ignores the
vagaries of the creative process. Several examples that indicate the method is not infallible
ore explored. The reasons why the misconception is so widespread ore discussed.

From the viewpoint of a physicist, the answer to the
que~tion "Is there a well defined scientific method?"
would be "No." Before justifying this answer, however,
we must define what we are saying "no" to. Many elementary science texts carry on at great length about the
"scientific method" as an objective, foolproof procedure
for proceeding from ignorance to knowledge. The "Method" allows the scientist to proceed from observation to
hypothesis to prediction to another observation, in a never-ending spiral of progress.
Certainly, in the broadest sense, this is the way by
which scientists make discoveries. In fact, for a simple
problem (such as diagnosing the trouble in a faulty piece
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of laboratory equipment) it may work quite well. But a
scientist trying to make a significant discovery finds that
the real world is just too complicated, and that progress
is neither as objective nor as guaranteed as the "method"
would supposedly make it.
One can easily think of six reasons why the "method"
is an oversimplification.
1. The key observation may result from an accident.
This breaks the link between prediction and observation.
Any practicing physicist knows that an experiment is
often performed, not to verify some prediction, but because it seems like an easy one to do or because the apparatus is available. In other cases, the interesting result
may be the unexpected byproduct of some other work.
A famous example is the discovery of electron diffraction by Davisson and Germer ( 1927) . To quote their
paper:
The investigation reported in this paper was begun as
the result of an accident which occurred in this laboratory
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